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Abstract—The new culture of networked systems that offer
everywhere accessible services has given rise to various types of
security trade-offs. In fact, with the evolution of physical systems
that keep getting integrated with cyber frameworks, cyber threats
have far more critical effects as they get reflected on the physical
environment. As a result, the issue of security of cyber physical
systems requires a special holistic treatment. In this paper, we
study the trade-off between security, safety and availability in
such systems and demonstrate these concepts on implantable
medical devices as a case study. We discuss the challenges and
constraints associated with securing such systems and focus on
the trade-off between security measures required for blocking
unauthorized access to the device, and the safety of the patient
in emergency situations where such measures must be dropped
to allow access. We analyze the up to date proposed solutions
and discuss their strengths and limitations.
Index Terms—Access Control, Cyber Physical Systems, Im-
plantable Medical Devices, Security Vs. Safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vast growth of remotely accessible services has madeus unconsciously accept security trade-offs. For instance,
on daily basis, people share their information with remote
supposedly trusted entities because they seek faster responses
to their needs. Also, in the back of the average person’s mind,
the exchanged information is secured against various sources
of threats. Nevertheless, such convenience always comes with
a price. In other words, there is always a trade-off between
security of entities (individuals or states) and another desired
essential property. For example, the trade-off between the
privacy of individuals and the convenience of storing/accessing
information using multiple devices is evident in cloud com-
puting, where one can seemingly trust a company over a
local secondary storage with sensitive information. To gain
convenience, people are accepting some risk which could have
been easily avoided without the use of the cloud. A second
example, is the trade-off between state security and privacy
where governments claim the authority to monitor the contents
of emails, web searches, social networks accounts, and shared
files [1]. Despite its ethical controversial nature, this state mass
surveillance mechanisms are arguably gaining acceptance as
some people justify the compromise of individual privacies by
propagandizing the fear of terrorism.
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Yet, another example of security trade-offs is when en-
forcing security measures aimed to shield individuals from
possible threats can affect their safety and wellbeing or vice
versa [2]. A recent physical example on the case where
security was imposed at the expense of individuals safety
is the crash of the Germanwings flight 9525 [3]. The crash
was allegedly deliberate and caused by the co-pilot when
he took advantage of the post 9/11 aircraft security features
and locked the door of the cockpit leaving the pilot outside
without any means of getting in. Another case where safety
procedures contradicted with security is demonstrated in the
increased theft incidents of a European luxury car [2]. After
an independent investigation launched by the manufacturer, it
was discovered that the designers of the car recently installed
a new safety feature which enables the doors to unlock if
enough pressure is applied on the roof assuming that the car
rolled over in an accident. Accordingly, a car thief needs only
to jump on the roof of the car and the doors automatically
unlock. A safety feature that is meant to facilitate getting out
of the car in the case of a catastrophic event, compromised
its security by making it easier to break in when there is
no accident. In the sequel, modern cars are equipped with
mechanisms that enable the recording of driving habits such as
speed, visited locations, dates and timings of car trips [4]. Such
mechanisms include wireless technologies which in the case of
an accident, relevant information is transmitted to emergency
response centers. These black box like features are used as
safety and insurance measures, and in the same time they can
be considered as surveillance mechanisms that severely violate
the privacy of the owners of these cars.
Security trade-offs are visible in systems which are com-
posed of subsystems from different domains [5]. Such systems
include Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [6]–[8] which are
physical in nature and their operation requires advanced con-
nectivity and computation. Many CPSs are built from a phys-
ical systems that were developed before wireless communica-
tion and IT capabilities became an essential part of our daily
life [6]. Theses physical systems were usually constructed
based on their own proprietary components and communica-
tion protocols. Due to the separation of such systems from
the external networks and Internet technologies, their require-
ments focused on performance, reliability and safety. Indeed,
there was no need for communication security because these
systems were not vulnerable to typical cyber threats. In fact,
security for these systems concentrated on physically securing
access to the local network and the consoles that controlled the
systems [5]. Integrating these physical systems with advanced
connectivity and computation capabilities exposed them to
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new spectrum of cyber threats [7], [9]. Moreover, typical
defense mechanisms which are meant to thwart cyber threats
can sometimes conflict with another essential requirement of
the system. Accordingly, regulatory and standardization bodies
such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), have specific guidelines regarding integrating cyber
security features in industrial control systems [5]. Particularly,
these guidelines demonstrate the need for innovative solutions
and designs that accommodate security solutions with essential
requirements of the physical system such as security and
safety.
Security solutions adopted in CPSs respond differently when
compromised by an attack. In such case when a system fails
as a result of an attack, one of the following failure modes
[10] can be activated: (i) Fail stop where the system abruptly
stops operating and cannot be restarted easily, (ii) Fail safe
mode where the system changes its operation and enters a safe
mode to avoid any hazardous effects, (iii) Fail loud where the
system sounds an alarm in response to unauthorized alteration
of its state, and finally (iv) Fail quiet where the system allows
unauthorized access to its information without taking any
further actions.
CPSs has computation capabilities to sense data from
the domain they are embedded in, process it into valuable
information, and act on the physical context parameters in
response to the inferred information [7]. In particular, these
systems can sense vital information such as congestion, speed,
energy consumption or medical condition, perform specific
evaluations, and accordingly project the desired control or
protection over the surrounding physical environment. In the
sequel, in each CPS, there is a physical reaction for every
cyber action. Such reaction has an impact on the safety of
the physical environmental, and given the criticality of CPSs,
the potential consequences of cyber security incidents are of
paramount importance when compared to similar incidents in
computer systems. Additionally, most CPSs have high avail-
ability requirements which renders the possibility of adopting
various threat thwarting methods insupportable. For instance,
patching is a rarely acceptable mechanism in CPSs because
these systems usually lack having a prototype to test the patch
on [5]. Accordingly, there is no systematic way to predict the
effect of the patch on the system and the safety risks of having
the system unavailable for some time is much higher than the
risks of having an unpatched system
The tension between security and safety is manifested
in Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) [11] which are an
important class of CPSs. IMDs are inserted into the human
body to administer therapies related to a chronic medical
condition, monitor the state of some body parts, or to provide
the functionality of a malfunction organ [11], [12]. As depicted
in Figure 1, examples of IMDs include cardiac pacemakers
and defibrillator [13]–[15] which cope with cardiac conditions,
infusion pumps such as insulin pumps [16], neurostimulators
for brain stimulation [17], body area networks which are
composed of bio-sensors to trace various biological functions
[18]–[20], cochlear implants that provide hearing to those
with extreme deafness [21], and gastric simulators which emit
electrical pulses to the nerves and smooth muscle of the lower
stomach to decrease nausea and vomiting in patients with
gastroparesis [22]. These devices are now designed to com-
municate wirelessly with their respective programming devices
using a shared secret key to authenticate the programmer and
protect the communicated data [23], [24]. IMDs may also
transfer data about the patients health and receive information
to administer specific therapies. On one hand, the nature of
the exchange information makes IMDs critically vulnerable
to a wide range of threats that may affect the patient’s
life [11], [25], [26], and thus the necessity for controlling
their access using authentication protocols is absolute. On the
other hand, in case of emergency where the patient might be
incapacitated, these devices must allow communication with
unauthenticated programmers to allow doctors to administer
the required treatment which can save the patient’s life.
In this survey, we present a tutorial-style introduction to
security trade-offs in the context of cyber physical systems.
In particular, we investigate the case of implantable medical
devices. We discuss the trade-off between securing the device
in terms of access rights and the safety of the patient in case
of emergency. More precisely, we study how enforcing preset
authentication rules in normal situations and enabling on the
fly authentication in case of critical situations can be achieved.
While other survey results [11], [27] that investigated all
security aspects of IMDs, we focus on the analysis of the
up to date proposed authentication protocols which address
this trade-off and discuss their advantages and limitations.
Moreover, we contrast them with respect to the cryptographic
and security mechanisms implemented on the implant, and
other vulnerabilities and security properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, the definition of cyber physical systems is given
along with demonstrative examples. In section 3, we give an
overview of the possible security threats and the challenges
involved in securing such systems. Afterwards, in section 4,
we investigate the high level non functional requirements of
cyber physical systems and demonstrate them in the context
of smart grids, IMDs, and drones. In section 5, we em-
phasize on the security trade offs in the context of IMDs
as a case study. Primarily, because IMDs have high safety
requirements imposed by their critical physical environment
where securing the cyber domain of such systems demands
a dynamic approach in order to mitigate safety risks. We
start by giving and overview on various IMD technologies,
communication capabilities and adopted standards. Next, we
survey possible attacks and describe the realizable attacks that
have been demonstrated in a lab environment. In the sequel,
we investigate security research challenges that arise from
the critical constrained operation environment of IMDs. To
this end, we demonstrate security trade-offs in cyber physical
systems by investigation the tension between security and
safety in IMDs. We particularly categorize and analyze the
security proposals that aim to solve this tension by enforcing
access control polices that can be tightened in the normal
operation mode and loosened in case of emergency situations.
In our analysis, we summarize these proposals and contrast
them in terms of their advantages, limitations, and how they
address the trade-off between security and safety. Finally, we
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Fig. 1. Examples for wireless implantable devices
summarize the main ideas presented in the paper and discuss
open problems and future research directions.
II. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Context aware electronic systems that interact with their
physical surroundings are known as cyber physical systems
[7], [28], [29]. The deployment of such systems has widely
increased in the recent years. These systems include smart
power grids [30] which are dynamic and interactive infrastruc-
tures that combine high speed communication and monitoring
technologies with millions of power equipments to provide
efficient energy management such as advanced metering [30],
and demand and response capabilities [30], [31]. A second
example of cyber physical systems are implantable medical
devices [11] which are electronic systems embedded in the
human body to continuously monitor its health, detect and
predict certain conditions, and deliver therapies. Unmanned
vehicles [32] are another example of cyber physical systems
where they actively interact with the surrounding physical
objects to achieve their goals. Such vehicles use cameras and
proximity sensors to build a virtual terrains and accordingly
can make decisions in terms of speed and direction and
ultimately achieve their objective. The common factor between
all these examples is their interaction with their physical
environment which provides the information required for
accomplishing many of their functionalities. CPSs generally
use the information acquired from the physical environment,
and accordingly they affect the physical environment through
their operation. They also rely heavily on information net-
working infrastructures which makes them a good target to the
potential vulnerabilities associated with communications and
networking systems [9]. Although the cyber vulnerabilities are
similar to those of computer systems, their effect on CPSs may
vary according to the nature and criticality of the system. For
example, failing to protect the confidentiality of one’s email
password can lead to revealing her private correspondence
and possibly the compromise of other accounts credentials.
However, the privacy of the access credentials of a patient’s
cardiac implantable device is crucial for ensuring the safety
of her life especially if the patient is a high value target [33].
III. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CYBER PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS
Due to the entangled relation between physical and com-
putational infrastructures of CPSs, a comprehensive handling
of these systems in terms of security is required. More
precisely, the complexity, and diversification of both cyber
and physical components make the system vulnerable to a
variety of security threats and constraints [28], [29]. For
instance, damages and operation interruptions of the physical
infrastructure of a nation may be caused by bad weather
conditions or crises such as wars or terrorist plots which
intentionally target these critical infrastructures [34] to harm
and disrupt the lives of the general population. Other types
of attacks target the communication capabilities of CPSs. A
cluster of such attacks may only affect the system passively by
intruding and maliciously listening to the communications to
steal sensitive information. Other attacks can be more harmful
as they aim to bring down the IT system by either disrupting
the communication altogether, thus halting the activity of the
whole system, or by injecting malevolent information with the
intention to bypass security policies. The latter type of attacks
can be even used to affect the safety of the individuals present
in the physical environment of the CPSs through tampering
the expected proper interaction between them and the system.
Figure 2 depicts some examples for the sources of threats
in CPSs and the properties that are violated by them. The
continuous monitoring and analysis of data in the system,
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Fig. 2. Examples of threat sources in CPSs and the properties they violate.
especially the data required to evaluate the state and the
efficiency of the infrastructure, is essential for the evaluation
of both its performance and threats [7]. However, in some
systems such analysis can only be performed by monitoring
the utilization of the system services by its users which
raises major issues regarding the violation of their privacies
and proprietary information. For example, during the process
of efficient power distribution in smart grids, an analysis
of the power consumption among residential and industrial
areas is performed [30]. This analysis includes classification
of the households appliances types and usage timings and
average wattage consumption. Though it does not affect the
functionality of the infrastructure, such information can be
used to determine the valuable contents of a specific property,
and to even predict the timings at which it is empty and
thus, vulnerable for property theft [30]. Another example is
the unmanned vehicles which employ cameras which record
the surrounding areas to build terrains for its proper operation
[32]. The captured footage can be considered as surveillance
material which can be leaked and used against the will of the
individuals appearing in this footage [35]. Similarly, in the
case of implantable medical devices, information collected by
these systems include the device identifier, model, diagnosis,
and therapy regimen. Such information, if not handled se-
curely, can be used by malicious adversaries for blackmailing
purposes. Although protecting individuals privacy is a major
objective of most security policies implemented by CPSs, the
mere working of these systems to deliver safe and reliable
functionality contradicts such objective.
IV. PROPERTIES OF CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Generally, different CPSs operate in various environments
to achieve different purposes. However, their operation needs
to ensure both cyber and physical securities. From a high
level perspective, as depicted in Figure 3, safety, security, and
availability are key non functional requirements for the basic
working of CPSs [28]. Achieving these three properties in a
complex multidisciplinary systems is a challenging objective
and requires a careful holistic consideration. Particularly, be-
cause of the different nature of the cyber and physical compo-
nents of the system and the dynamic interaction between the
CPS and its physical environment. The continuous alteration
of the state of the system given the aggressive diversification of
the physical conditions renders optimally achieving the three
properties next to impossible [2], [28]. Indeed, there are always
trade-offs between one and another and hence, the scope of our
survey. As we are aiming to investigate the trade off between
security and other properties, in what follows, we describe
these properties in details:
 Safety: The operation of cyber physical systems
relies heavily on their interaction with their dynamic
environment and in most cases this environment
encompasses or directly affects living beings [28].
Accordingly, the most important requirement for any
given CPS is to ensure the safety of the individuals
involved in its operation. In other words, CPSs are
intelligent context aware systems [28] that take decisions
to influence the state of the surrounding physical and all
its constituents. For the safety of concerned individuals,
the operation of CPSs should account for all possible
scenarios and enumerate the corresponding possible
output decisions such that harming living beings is
avoided by all means. For example, in smart power
grids, there must be mechanisms to ensure that the
power is not shut off life sustainable devices and that
no over voltage delivery can take place. In unmanned
vehicles, incidents which cause malfunctioning of its
control and lead to crash and possibly loss of lives
should be covered by safety policies.
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 Security: Both physical and cyber securities should be
considered in the comprehensive security framework. In
other words, the protection of the physical components
of the system from theft, weather conditions, and
unauthorized tampering and the confidentiality and
integrity of information as well as information access
control must be considered. For example, in the case of
smart power grids, all the equipment that must be located
outdoors should be installed in a weatherproof housing.
Also, policies and protocols must be established such
that both information and the operational facilities of the
system are only accessed with the adequate authorization.
Failing to do so may have catastrophic results, especially
for those CPSs that are used in critical situations. For
instance, an attack on an insulin pump was demonstrated
in a lab where a malicious unauthorized adversary
took control over it and programmed it to inject an
elevated number of insulin units which, if injected in
a human body, would directly lead to hypoglycemic
coma and possibly death [36], [37]. Confidentiality of
sensitive information related to the physical components
of CPSs must also be protected. The availability of
such information to malicious entities can be exploited
in blackmailing acts, discrimination, identity theft, and
burglary. For example, the unauthorized acquisition of
the footages captured by air drones can be used in
stealing sensitive information or for extortion. A main
key feature in the security of CPSs is that cyber attacks
have a physical impact. Accordingly, computer security
solutions that deal with cyber threats only are not
enough. There must be a comprehensive approach that
considered both the cyber and critical physical processes
of the system.
 Availability: CPSs are usually used to provide critical
functionality, thus it is expected that their operation
is available uninterruptedly for a long period of time.
Accordingly, implementations of both the cyber and phys-
ical components must be coordinated to provide means
for such continuous operation. In other words, there
should be a reasonable balance between the power/energy
required for the computation and that consumed by
the actuation especially in resource constrained systems.
Indeed, in highly critical systems where downtimes are
not acceptable, vulnerabilities patching procedures are
avoided as much as possible. This measure is attributed
to the fact that patching usually requires rebooting the
system. Also, sometimes patches can trigger other actions
that may tamper with the system’s operation. Because the
availability requirements of such systems outweigh the
risks of the found vulnerabilities, they remain unpatched
[5].
Security trade-offs in CPSs depend on the physical environ-
ment of the system, as well as the criticality of its application.
In other words, according to the main objectives of the system,
operation requirements have a specific priority order. In the
sequel, in order to demonstrate the concept of security trade-
offs in CPSs, we investigate it in the case of implantable
medical devices where the system operation is highly critical
as it affects the health and sometimes the life of the patient.
Also, the physical environment which is the human tissues is
extremely constrained which further limits the options that can
be adopted by security solutions.
V. IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES
Modern IMDs communicate wirelessly with an external
device known as “programmer”to send monitoring data or
receive updated therapeutic regimens. Previous generation
of IMDs enabled wireless communication with programmers
which are at its close proximity within the range of 2m. In
other words, the patient needed to be physically present in the
hospital or her treatment facility for her physician to gain ac-
cess to the IMD. Current IMDs provide advanced computation
and communication capability known as telemetry [23] which
enables longer range remote wireless access to the IMD usu-
ally between 10 to 20 meters. These IMDs have significantly
transformed the medical devices industry as they proved to be
very useful in monitoring the vital signs of patients, especially
the ones with critical conditions. More precisely, a patient can
be in her home and the IMD sends the monitored vitals data to
an in-house device that communicates the information to the
physician. The continuous monitoring helps transfer real time
information in the case of life threatening situations which
ensures that the patient gets the required medical attention as
quickly as possible. In what follows, we briefly describe some
of the available communication standards used by different
IMDs.
A. Telemetry
IMDs are increasingly relying on various networking capa-
bilities for wireless communication. IMDs communicate with
external programmers using Radio Frequency (RF) signals
utilizing specific frequency spectrum [24]. Telemetry for im-
plantable medical devices is regulated by one or more of the
following standards:
 Wireless Medical Telemetry Services (WMTS) specifica-
tion [23], [38]: This spectrum is a U.S. standard defined
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). It is
used by IMDs withing the United States only as it is not
an internationally regulated standard.
 Medical Implant Communication System (MICS) specifi-
cation [23]: This standard is a radio service that is mainly
used for communications between IMDs and program-
mers. Devices operating using MICS has a small com-
munication range (about 2 meters) and low bandwidth.
However, due to the conductive nature of the human body,
MICS radio signals can be transmitted between external
programmers and IMDs.
 Medical Device Radiocommunications Service (MedRa-
dio) [39]: this standard is a radio band defined to be
used by implanted and wearable medical devices. The
standard dates back to 1999 but was approved by the
FCC in 2009. The communication spectrum of MedRadio
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Fig. 3. High level properties of cyber physical systems
is internationally and independently used for IMD com-
munications and it also transmits signals easily through
the human body
B. Cyber Attacks on IMDs
The leisure of providing patients with appreciable autonomy
and faster response to their needs comes with the challenge
of securing the communicated information as a door to a
new source of security and privacy threats for the patient is
opened. The majority of such threats [40]–[42] are related to
their wireless networking capabilities and similar to the threats
available to the different IT systems. In fact, previous in-vitro
demonstrations [15], [36], [37], [43] have shown that IMD
security is highly compromised and that any adversary with
malicious intent can bypass the simple security mechanisms
and gain access to this device, which can cause damages
ranging from invasion of privacy to the threating the life of the
patient with the IMD. In other words, attacks against an IMD
can put at risk the safety of the patient who uses it and can be
fatal in some scenarios [15], [43]. The deliberate tampering of
a critical implant such as cardiac implants or insulin injectors
can lead to death as has been demonstrated in the following
cases:
 The first case was presented by Halperin et al [15] where
they demonstrated attacks on an implantable cardioverter
defibrillator. In this work, the protocol employed by
the implant was reverse engineered and software radio
based attacks were used to read the information stored
on the IMD and reprogram it to change the prescribed
therapy. Moreover, the IMD was made to communicate
indefinitely with an unauthenticated external device, thus
posing a potential denial of service. The presented attacks
were the first to be implemented on a real commercial
cardioverter defibrillator and were shocking as they intro-
duced a realizable compromise of the safety and privacy
of the patient.
 Another case was demonstrated by Jerome Radcliffe [36]
who is a diabetic himself, where utilizing the ID of
the device, he took control of his own insulin pump by
connecting to it remotely from a distance of 100 feet.
Moreover, Radcliffe showed how he can command the
pump to inject insulin every three minutes or stop insulin
delivery. Afterwards, the attack was improved by Burnaby
Jack [37] to enable an adversary to compromise any
vulnerable device within 300 feet without the knowledge
of its ID. Furthermore, hijacking attacks on insulin pumps
have also been investigated by Li et al. [16] where
utilizing off the shelf software defined radio device, they
were able to eavesdrop on the wireless communication
and command the devices to alter the prescribed therapy.
 Barnaby Jack demonstrated several ways in which an
implantable cardiac devices could be accessed [43]. Ad-
ditionally, he used a laptop 50 feet away from the IMD
to deliver a deadly 830 volt shock.
 Hanna et al. presented an attack on a Cardiac Automated
External Defibrillator (CAED) [44]. Exploiting the fact
that the CAED did not verify the authenticity and fresh-
ness of software updates, the attack enabled the successful
update of the device by custom firmware. Such update
can be used to stop the device from administering life
saving electrical pulses or enforce them to deliver shocks
of high strength.
Other attacks aim to deplete the battery [45] and render
the device useless, thus forcing the patient to undergo an
additional surgery to change the implant [13], [46]. Moreover,
cardiac implants have a switch that can be turned off by
applying a magnetic field at close proximity [47]to protect
the implants from electromagnetic fields when the patient
undergoes cardiac surgery using electrocautery devices [48].
This property could be exploited by an attacker and all she has
to do is to generate magnetic field and be close to the patient.
For that reason, the former U.S. vice president Dick Cheney
had his modern implantable cardioverter defibrillator replaced
by another one without WiFi capability [33].
IMDs usually adopt security by obscurity [49]. However, the
implemented protocols can be sometimes reverse engineered
to gain access to the implant [15], [41]. Moreover, the patient
with the IMD can be remotely detected and any adversary
can listen to insecure communications which enables access to
exchanged data. Such data may contain sensitive information
such as vital signals, diagnosed conditions, and prescribed
therapies [11], [27], [42].
Despite the dangers imposed by cyber attacks, patients seem
to be unaware of their effects as they tend to think about the
security of their IMDs as a secondary aspect. This fact was
investigated by Denning et al. [50] where a study with 13
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patients with IMDs was carried out. The patients were asked
about their understanding of the IMD security and privacy
issues and how they feel towards various security mechanisms.
Ten patients expressed no concern about an adversary chang-
ing their IMD settings without their consent, seven patients
were not worried about emergency responders being denied
access to their IMDs in the case of an emergency, and only 7
patients agreed that security mechanisms should be adopted to
protect future IMDs. Similarly, manufacturers of IMDs often
are reluctant to introduce new security mechanisms because
of the delay consequences such actions may have on the
regulatory approval process [51].
C. Cyber Threats on IMDs
A study to investigate how wireless IMDs are protected
against information security threats was carried by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) [52]. In August
2012, the GAO determined that the current threats can indeed
affect the security and safety of patients with IMDs and it
published a report with a recommendation to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), urging it to adopt a strategy that
focuses on information security risks. In June 2013, the FDA
released a safety communication containing guidelines for the
industry on the design, testing, and use of wireless medical
devices [53]. The released safety communication stressed on
the significance of the security of the exchanged wireless
information to protect the privacy of the patient, and to
prevent unauthorized access to medical devices with built in
wireless capabilities. In particular, the FDA communication
stated that wireless medical devices must implement crypto-
graphic approaches to protect communications and accesses.
The required mechanisms are determined according to the type
and probability of expected threats which the device can be
vulnerable to, as well as the operating environment and the
consequences on the patient in case of a security incident.
Generally, IMDs are vulnerable to the following threats:
 Information harvesting: Recently, the value of electronic
personal health information has been rising drastically
on the black market. According to a 2012 Healthcare
Information and Management Systems Society report,
personal health information is more valuable than credit
card data [54]. In fact, the value of a patient health
record in the black market is estimated to be $50,
compared to $3 for a social security number and $1.50
for a credit card. Consequently, if no authentication
mechanisms are enforced in IMDs, any adversary
may obtain a commercial programmer and command
the attacked IMD to illegitimately obtain the private
information related to the health of the patient [21],
[25], [40]. Alternatively, an eavesdropper can listen
to unencrypted communications between IMDs and
legitimate programmers. The harvested information can
be used to carry out additional attacks.
 Tracking the patient: A patient with an IMD supporting
wireless communication can be easily detected especially
when she is in the open [11]. Accordingly, an attacker
in possession of a large number of programmers
can effectively track the movement of a patient with
IMD as long as its communication is covered by the
range of the programmers [55]. Although, tracking a
person’s movement is not harmful by itself and in some
cases such as patients with dementia or Alzheimer, it
may be a beneficial, it poses a severe violation of privacy.
 Impersonation: An adversary can impersonate either
the IMD or the programmer if the wireless channel is
not properly protected [41], [54]. More precisely, the
adversary can eavesdrop on legitimate communications
and record the IMDs handshake reply to a genuine
programmer. Later, when the IMD is interrogated by
the programmer, the adversary can replay the recorded
messages and convince the programmer that it is talking
to the IMD. Such attacks can be used to harvest further
information regarding the patient therapies or to feed
falsified information to the patient’s physician which can
delay the response to the needs of the patient and in
some cases endanger her life.
 Relaying attacks: This type of attacks is used to trick
the IMD by making it assume that it is taking to a
programmer at it close vicinity. More precisely, IMDs
using either the telemetric MICS or WMTS bands
have limited communication ranges (within 2 meters)
[23] which implies that a programmer must be in
close proximity to the IMD. However, an attacker can
illegitimately convince the IMD that its talking to a
programmer within its proximity by adopting a special
setting with two devices, called a ghost and a leech
which supports fast long range communication [55]. In
this setting, the ghost impersonates an IMD to a genuine
programmer, and the leech pretends to be a programmer
to the IMD. In proximity-based authentication protocols
[56], the leach and ghost keep relaying the messages
between the IMD and the programmer to trick the
IMD into believing that it is talking to an authorized
programmer.
 Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks: These attacks aim to
tamper with the availability of the IMD to perform its
job [55]. DOS attacks can be launched using several
approaches, for instance an attacker may try to request
power consuming tasks from the IMD, thus leading to a
power draining attack [45]. Another method to prevent
the IMD from servicing legitimate programmer is to
interfere with its communication. Particularly, using a
signal jamming device, an adversary can scramble all
the responses of the IMD to legitimate requests which
renders it meaningless for the requesting programmer
[57]. Moreover, by exerting a magnetic field at close
proximity to a patient, an IMD with magnetic switch will
shut itself off [48].
Addressing the IMD security and privacy issues is a challeng-
ing task [55], [58], [59] because of the increased demand for
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a longer range for the wireless communication which creates
new threat models and widens the scope of the existing ones.
Another factor is the resource constraints of an IMDs in terms
of area required by the processor and memory, and power
consumption (i.e., battery). Hence, trade-offs are unavoidable
when choosing between various security strategies. Next, we
give a brief review on the existing challenges, constraints, and
trade-offs in securing IMDs.
D. Challenges and Security Trade-offs in IMDs
Although the attacks on the wireless information commu-
nication in IMDs are similar to that in computer systems
networks which have standard mitigation techniques, adapting
the exact protection techniques for IMDs cannot always be
feasible. In other words, such techniques must not only be
secure in order to be deployable on IMDs, but it must
also operate within the constrains imposed by the physical
environment. More precisely, there is a number of challenges
and constraints in securing IMDs attributed to the operating
physical environment that makes protecting it follows a com-
pletely different scenario from securing computer networks.
In what follows, we cite five challenges (depicted in Figure 4)
which face any security solution adopted by IMDs:
Fig. 4. Challenges in securing IMDs
1) Critical physical environment: IMDs are embedded in
the human body in direct contact with vital tissues. The
casings IMDs are made of biomedical materials such
as titanium, silicone, or apatite [60]. Such materials
do not react with the surrounding environment and
are not affected by the corrosive nature of different
bodily fluids. Even though IMDs use biomedical mate-
rial, there have been reported cases where the patient’s
body passes through recurrent body rejection episodes
which is usually accompanied by inflammation and
pain. The volume and weight of the packaged implant
device must be small and light so that it does not
affect the normal activity of the patient. Adopting a
security approach must consider the criticality of the
operation environment. In particular, security solutions
must consider the safe amount of power dissipation and
RF radiation [60]. Since the implant is embedded in
the human body usually beneath the skin by 2 to 5
centimeters, it has a limited area and accordingly tiny
microprocessor and memory. Accordingly, any set of
executed concurrent operations on the device should
not cause heat dissipation above certain levels [60].
Also, the increased number of exchanged messages can
subject the patient to additional RF radiation. Excessive
amounts of power dissipation and RF radiation can lead
to damage in the surrounding tissues and may trigger
implant induced coagulation and/or allergic foreign body
response [60].
2) Constrained resources: In addition to having a tiny
area, IMDs encompass an integrated non rechargeable
battery which is supposed to last between 8 to 10 years
[61]. Accordingly, power should be manged efficiently
by processing and communication elements. These con-
straints complicate the ability to implement the tradi-
tional cryptographic techniques which efficiently satisfy
both security and safety. In other words, a typical
authentication protocol to control who is granted the
right to access the IMD requires multiple executions of a
symmetric encryption algorithm, a public key algorithm
(usually adopted in key distribution via public key
infrastructure), and sometimes a hash function, all of
which if implemented, require high processing power
which will deplete the battery much sooner than its
expected lifetime. Moreover, if the battery is depleted,
the whole IMD needs to be replaced via surgery which
comes with its associated risks on the patient’s health.
3) Legacy compatibility: Another important challenge is
that adopting any new cryptographic solution involves
modifying the IMD which means that all the already
implanted devices will remain vulnerable to the above
mentioned security threats. In fact, there are millions
of cardiac implants already in use and about 700,000
are implanted each year [62]. Accordingly, a favorable
cryptography-based security solution is the one that can
provide an additional mechanism to secure the already
implanted IMD as well.
4) Bureaucracy: The process of adopting a security solu-
tion for IMDs is completely inflexible. More precisely,
a given security mechanism changes the nature of the
IMD and such change must first go through quality
and compliance testing by various regulatory bodies.
Additionally, in the U.S., it must be approved by the
FDA whose process encounters bureaucratic delays that
may reach 7 years [51]. During this period, the security
system may even become obsolete because of the new
emerging generation of IMDs with advanced technolo-
gies.
5) Emergency authentication: The most important chal-
lenge, as it directly affects the life of the patients, is
how to deal with authentication to access the IMD in
case of emergency [41]. More precisely, suppose an
incapacitated patient is presented at the emergency room
in a hospital different than hers. Health professionals
at that hospital should be able access the IMD using
their unauthenticated programmers to gain personal and
therapy information about the patient. The safety of the
patient can be endangered if the IMD implements a rig-
orous access control protocol that does not consider this
scenario. Any acceptable authentication protocol must
also provide a way for unauthenticated programmers to
communicate with IMDs in the event of an emergency.
The tension between securing the access to IMDs and the
safety of patients in the case of emergencies [41], [55], [58]
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has been addresses in several proposals, each with its own
inherent weaknesses. Next, we survey these techniques and
discuss their pros and cons.
E. Threat models
All the surveyed proposals consider attacks by one or more
threat model out of the three following adversarial models:
 An adversary with a commercial programmer which is
unauthorized by the IMD. These programmers usually
contain no mechanism to restrict their use by only health
professionals.
 A passive adversary who has the capability to listen to the
communications on the RF channel between IMDs and
their respective programmers. It is also assumed that she
possesses all the necessary equipments to capture, record,
and analyze the acquired RF transmissions.
 An active adversary who possesses the abilities of the
passive adversary and can generate RF signals to send
commands to the IMD, modify messages in transit before
they reach the IMD or the programmer, or just block them
so that they never arrive to either parties.
All the authentication protocols that authenticate programmers
in emergency situations using readings of physiological values
assume that the adversary is present during the IMD and
programmer authentication. However, the adversary cannot
touch the patient and is usually present within 2m for IMDs
using MICS and WMTS and up to 10m if using advanced com-
munication capabilities. The proximity assumption is based
on the fact that if an attacker is close enough to touch an
unconscious patient, then she might as well inflict harmful
actions on the patient without going through the technical
complications of attacking the IMD. While the proximity
assumption is true, an adversary attacking the IMD has the
advantages of both the stealthiness and untraceability.
VI. SECURITY VS. SAFETY: A CASE STUDY ON
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS IN IMDS
Cryptographic algorithms are the main building blocks in
authentication protocols. Since traditional public key cryp-
tography requires considerably high computation and com-
munication capabilities, it is not well suited for the resource
constrained environment of IMDs. Hence, the use symmetric
ciphers are better option for such requirements. However,
IMDs and their authorized programmers must share a private
key which is used for authenticating both devices to each
other and for encrypting the exchanged information. Generally,
symmetric cryptographic schemes suffer from inefficient key
distribution mechanisms and the problem gets worse in the
case of IMDs because the solutions do not suit the constrained
environment .
Authentication protocols in the case IMDs differs com-
pletely than that adopted in computer systems [27]. First
because of the resource constraints of IMDs do not allow
such protocols to operate efficiently. Second because IMDs
require access polices of dynamic nature. More precisely,
while IMDs must adopt access control policies to mitigate
unauthorized access, they should offer a loosely permissive
access control policies when life threatening medical events
take place. Health care professionals may need to reprogram
IMDs or read the patient’s information and diagnosis from
them. One proposal [63] has suggested that a preset secret
key is to be coded in the IMD and used by any programmer
to access this particular IMD. Moreover, the key is stored
printed on the patient’s skin using ultraviolet pigmentation
(invisible tattoo) to be read by special programmers equipped
with ultraviolet readers. Another solution proposes that the
cryptographic key used by the IMD can be stored on an
external wearable bracelet. However, both solutions reveal the
IMD secret key to all the programmers and their associated
personnels which renders it not a secret after a while. In the
case of the wearable bracelet, the key is externally present
and can be seen or photographed by attackers. Moreover, if
the bracelet is lost or stolen, the IMD becomes unaccessible
or only accessible by a malicious adversary.
In what follows we survey the IMD authentication proposals
that consider authentication in emergency situations. We first
categorize them based on the adopted approach and discuss
their main advantages and their constraints. The adopted
approaches are: (i) Proximity-based techniques [64]–[66]
that authorize only programmers which are close to the
patient, (ii) Proxy-based approaches [67]–[70] where another
device is employed to handle the authentication process,
(iii) Biometric-based approaches [71]–[74] which require
the biometric features of the patient to grant access to her
IMD, and (iv) Hybrid approaches [75], [76] that propose
new techniques and integrate them with other approaches to
authenticate programmers. The surveyed protocols and the
adopted categorization are depicted in Figure 5.
1) Proximity Detection Approaches: The set of
authentication protocols under this category adopts the
fact that close proximity [77] and sometimes the concept
of touch-to-access ensure the awareness and consent of a
conscious patient to external authentication attempts [15],
[56], [78]. Moreover, in the case of critical situations when
the patient is incapacitated, access attempts from programmer
devices operated by any emergency responders can always
succeed. Mechanisms proposed in [79] have introduces some
ideas by which an attacker can hijack the proximity, thus
allowing unauthorized authentication
Zero power sensible security (ZP Sec): Halperin et
al. [15] proposed a set of defenses against unauthorized ac-
cesses. Particularly, their approach aimed to mitigate complex
cryptographic solutions in order to avoid depleting the battery
of the implant. They first presented zero power authentica-
tion mechanism where a Wireless Identification and Sensing
Platform (WISP) and a piezoelectric element circuitry are
implanted in the human body. The WISP harvests energy from
RF signals generated from programmers, at close proximity
of the patient which are trying to connect to the IMD. The
harvested energy is used to feed the piezoelectric element
so that it emits the secret parameters required to calculate
the shared key acoustically such that only programmers with
microphones touching the patient can sense these signals. To
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Fig. 5. Authentication approach categories and their respective protocols.
further enable the detection of unauthorized access attempts,
the authors proposed Zero power notification where the WISP
fails loud [10] by audibly warning the patient of events of
cryptographic operations via a combination of auditory and
tactile stimulation.
Strengths: The main advantage of the zero-power
scheme is that it is highly aware of the criticality of the
context of the physical environment associated with IMDs.
More precisely, although the security module is implanted in
the human body, it consumes no battery power at all, thus
preserving all the available power of the IMD to the more
important communication and actuation operations required
for the treatment of the patient. All the power needed for both
the authentication and notification mechanisms is harvested
from the RF signals generated by access attempts from the
programmer devices. Another advantage is that the adopted
cryptosystem for the key establishments phase is very light.
More specifically, this stage requires only a simple four steps
challenge-response protocol. Additionally, it is very fast as
the embedded security module performs one execution of a
symmetric key encryption algorithm only to generate a 128-
bit key to be used for encrypting the communication between
the IMD and the programmer.
Weaknesses: A major disadvantage of the zero-power
authentication scheme is that the authentication module
(containing the WISP and the piezoelectric element) must
be implanted 1cm beneath the skin so that the released
acoustic signals are detectable by the programmer device.
This constraint means that the authentication and notification
circuitry cannot be incorporated for use with the IMDs that
need to be embedded deeper within the human body. Having
both the module and the IMD independently implanted in
the human body raises the question of how the module can
further communicate the established key with the IMD. The
scheme also requires that the microphone of the programmer
is placed directly above the implanted security module
which means that in case that the patient is unconscious,
emergency responders will have to find a way to locate it
for authentication to take place. A straight forward solution
to this problem is to permanently mark (using tattoos) the
place of the module on the skin so that it is clearly visible
in case of emergencies. However, being permanently visibly
marked may not be accepted among patients due to religious
or social reasons (e.g., tattoos may be perceived as a mark
of low socioeconomic status or undesirable affiliations) [63].
Additionally, this solution leaves the patients recognizable
by adversaries which may later facilitate the ability of being
targeted by attackers/blackmailers. Also, the psychological
impact on patients from false positive alarms may by itself
induce a stress state [11]. An attack by Halevi et al. [64]
demonstrated that using a general purpose microphone, the
secret generated acoustically by the piezo element can be
recovered from a distance of 0.9m with success probability
of 99.88%.
Ultrasound-based distance bounding (US-DB): In this
authentication protocol, Rasmussen et al. [65] proposed a
method to detect the proximity of a programmer device
attempting to communicate with the IMD based on the speed
of sound. The mechanism adopts the Diffie-Hellman (DH)
key agreement protocol [80] to generate the shared private
key required for encrypting the communicated information. In
this protocol, both the IMD and programmer generate their
own partial secret key, known as the DH secret, via modular
exponentiation. Then they both exchange their masked DH
secrets through two sequential rounds of rapid bit exchanges.
In each round, either the IMD or the programmer receives
a masked bit from the other party through a radio channel
and sends a masked bit of its DH secret contribution utilizing
a sound channel. Accordingly, based on the speed of sound
and taking into account the expected delays, the receiver can
determine the proximity of the other party. At the end of the
protocol both the IMD and the programmer have each others
secrets and can compute one shared secret key.
Strengths: Since the mechanism relies on the speed of
sound in determining the proximity of the programmer, it does
not require the programmer to touch the skin of the patient
which slightly loosens the restriction of the touch-to-access
policy. In fact, any programmer, operated by a malicious
individual or a legitimate one, can reply via sound signals
to the challenges that was sent by the IMD over the radio
channel. However, because the speed of sound cannot be
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altered, only those programmers within the acceptable distance
to the patient will be authenticated. A second advantage is that
although the protocol adopts a public key scheme that employs
modular exponentiation which is a computationally exhaustive
task, the IMD executes its part of the algorithm and generates
its DH secret only after it determines that the programmer
is authenticated (i.e., within close proximity), thus mitigating
going through this power consuming operations in the event
of an adversary launching a battery draining attack. Unlike the
case of [63], the mechanism is not based on specific credentials
which could be lost, stolen, or duplicated which renders the
implant unaccessible or subjects it to an unauthorized access.
Weaknesses: It was found that some RF signals could
be sent to the IMD and affect the circuitry of the embedded
audio receiver by inducing a current in it [65]. More precisely,
the protocol measures the distance between the patient and the
programmer by detecting the presence of electrical currents
in the audio receiver. Accordingly, if an attacker is able to
use radio signals from farther distance to induce current in
the audio receiver, she will be authenticated by the IMD
and authorized to access the device. The solution to such
breach is protecting the IMD by an RF shield which further
complicates the IMD design. However, if no adequate RF
shielding is in place, an attacker with the proper equipment
can effectively trick the IMD into assuming it received a
sound signal while in fact it received an RF signal.
In-vivo NFC: This mechanism is proposed by Kim et
al. [66] to enable authenticated access to the IMD using
Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled smart phones. NFC
technology has a communication ranging between 10cm to
1m depending on the type of the adopted NFC standard. Such
communication limit suits distance bounding applications such
as IMDs. The work in [66] proposes to insert an in-vivo
(within the human body) NFC tag in IMDs to communicate
with the ex-vivo NFC reader embedded in the patent’s smart
phone which basically acts as the programmer device. The
smart phone in return can relay the information retrieved
from the IMD to the appropriate medical personnel via a
3G or a WiFi network. The employed NFC tag adopts NXP
proprietary security protocol for authentication and ciphering.
This proposal offers no cryptographic solution to the access
control problem but rather a system with its own implemented
security protocol to enable the IMD to communicate with a
specific smart phone within maximum distance of 1m.
Strengths: The system adopts two types of NFC tags for
the tag in the IMD and the one in the smart phone. Specifically,
a passive in-vivo NFC tag is used in the IMD which requires
no power from the battery of the implant for its operation
and an active NFC tag in the smart phone which provides
the power for the in-vivo NFC tag. Such adaptation is very
desirable for prolonging the battery life of the IMD. While
the heat dissipation by the IMD processing and communication
has been a critical issue during their design, mainly because
continuous exposure to even slightly elevated temperature can
damage the surrounding tissues, operations of the in-vivo NFC
tag results in minimum heat dissipation.
Weaknesses: A major disadvantage of this protocol is
the process by which the secret key is shared between the
IMD and the patient’s smart phone. In particular, the authors
assume that a long term predeployed key is shared between
the two NFC tags at the time of the surgical implantation
of the IMD. Such key agreement method is limiting as the
shared key cannot be changed which makes the protocol
arguably unpractical because it raises a huge concern with
regards to what happens if the phone is lost, stolen, or even
broken. In such cases, the whole protocol becomes useless.
2) Proxy-based Protocols: The set of protocols surveyed
under this category employ an external device to mediate
the communication between the programmer and the IMD.
These external devices implement access control procedures
and accordingly are responsible for determining who
communicates with the IMD, thus removing the burden of
establishing secure communication from the IMD. While
approaches that operate under this category offer an active
solution to the problem of IMD access in the event of
emergency by providing fail open access [10] to the IMD,
they suffer from security issues in the case when the proxy
device is lost or broken which leaves the IMD with no
security protection. Nevertheless, this category is the most
desired by medical providers when given the chance to choose
between different approaches [81]. Particularly, because of its
fail open guaranteed access in the case of emergency.
The Cloaker: In this proposal, Denning et al. [67]
describe the Cloaker as an externally worn device that protects
the security of the IMD as long as it is worn and provides open
access when removed. The IMD ignores all access attempt as
long as it detects the presence of the clocker. In the case of
emergency, emergency responders can remove the Cloaker and
the IMD responds to any access requests. The Cloaker shares
a long term master key with the IMD which authenticates
and encrypts all the data communication between them. Since
the Cloaker is an external device with more computational
and power capabilities, public key protocols can be used to
authenticate legitimate programmers and to establish a shared
session key. Then all communication between the programmer
and the IMD can either go through the Clocker, or the shared
key can be handed by the Clocker to both the programmer and
the IMD to communicate separately. The scheme encompasses
two approaches by which the IMD can detect the presence of
the Cloaker. Firstly, the IMD pings the Cloaker only when it
detects an access request so that the Cloaker takes over the
authentication procedure if present. Secondly, the IMD sends
periodic keep-alive messages and updates its state according to
the response from the Cloaker. In both cases, the IMD assumes
an emergency mode if it receives no response from the Cloaker
after a prespecified waiting period.
Strengths: This solution highly prioritizes the safety of
patients in emergency situations. In fact, it offers a very fast
response time from the IMD during emergency situations.
More specifically, no security measures or authentication pro-
cedures are applied in such time sensitive scenarios and the
functionality of the IMD is completely dedicated to respond
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to the requested commands. This approach can be seen as an
adoption from a framework of solutions known as Breaking
the Glass [82], [83] which enables overriding of access control
requirements in critical situations for the system. Moreover, if
the Cloaker is lost, broken, or out of batteries, it can still
be accessed in the event of an emergency. Also, since the
Cloaker can be set to mediate all communication between the
programmer and the IMD, it can create a log record which
allows forensic analysis if required.
Weaknesses: The two ways by which the IMD detects
the presence of the Cloaker are not efficient in terms of
power consumption. More precisely, according to the FCC
regulations [23], IMDs must not initiate any communication
unless a life threatening condition is detected. Additionally,
wireless communication is the most power consuming
operation in IMDs. Accordingly, forcing IMDs to periodically
send messages to detect the presence of the Cloaker is not an
efficient approach. Also, the response of the Cloaker in both
cases can be jammed by an active adversary which forces
the IMD to grant access to any requesting programmers.
Lastly, the Cloaker shares a predeployed long term key with
the IMD which we assume is set in the IMD at the time of
implantation. Nevertheless, the proposal does not address the
situation when the Cloaker is lost or broken and how a new
Cloaker may share the secret key with already implanted
medical devices.
IMD Guard: This protocol [68] proposes that an external
device, called the Guardian, employs electrocardiogram (ECG)
signals to extract long term secret key to be shared between
the IMD and its Guardian. The protocol first defines a key
establishment phase by which the IMD and the Guardian can
share a secret key. In this phase, both parties commence by
synchronously reading the ECG and taking the least signif-
icant 4 bits of 43 consecutive intra pulse intervals (IPI4).
ECG is considered a time varying physiological value which
makes it well suited for this purpose [84]. Studies in [84]
have shown that these bits are independent and identically
distributed. Also, the analysis presented in [72], [84] have
confirmed that these bits have the maximal entropy and are
completely uncorrelated. Additionally, discrepancies between
different readings of an ECG signal have been investigated in
[20]. In the sequel, both the IMD and the programmer enters
the first round of key confirmation where they exchange the
parity of each 4 bits from the 43 IPI4, and if the parities
match, the first bit is dropped because the parity leaks one bit
of information, but if the parities differ, then the IPI block
is dropped and subsequent IPI are read to complete a 129
bit key. Then the 2 parties exchange the hashes of the keys
and if they do not match, another round of parity checking on
the 3 bit blocks that survived in the first round is performed.
The protocol supports two modes of operation. First, a normal
mode where the Guardian is worn. In this mode, when a
programmer requests access, the IMD replies with a session
ID and a fresh nonce, and waits for a specific time T1 for
the Guardian to authenticate the programmer and distribute
a session key for the IMD and the programmer. In the case
that the IMD receives no reply from the Guardian, it enters
emergency mode assuming that the Guardian is physically
removed and sends a nonce to the programmer, waits a time
period T2, then sends a second nonce. Finally, the programmer
replies to the IMD with a message containing the hash of
the nonces. On the other hand, if the Guardian is physically
available, it authenticates the programmer employing a public
key scheme and sends the generated one time session key to
the IMD so that it can communicate with the programmer
securely before the first waiting time has elapsed.
Strengths: The most important feature in this protocol
is that the shared key between the Guardian and the IMD
can be changed. In other words, there is no need for any
predeployed secret in the IMD. Accordingly, it is easy to
rekey the IMD when the Guardian is lost or malfunctioning.
Another advantage is that the two nonces that the IMD sends
to the programmer when it receives no response from the
Guardian are separated by T2 seconds. This step prevents
an adversary from convincing the IMD that the Guardian is
absent by jamming its response after T1. In other words, the
Guardian can be calibrated to the parameters of its own IMD,
thus if it detects the first nonce being sent by the IMD to the
programmer, then it knows that its first response did not reach
the IMD because it has been jammed. Because the guardian
knows that the IMD will send another nonce after T2 time, it
jams the IMDs transmissions to prevent it from reaching the
programmer.
Weaknesses: This protocol relies on the fact that ECG
signals can only be measured with skin contact. Nevertheless,
analysis in [85] has demonstrated that by video recording
the face of a person over a period of time, movement and
change in the color of the face with each heart beat pulse
can be traced. Moreover, the resulted set of IPI4 calculated
by analyzing the video recording slightly differs than the one
obtained by recording the ECG by touching the body. This
results suggests that a remote adversary can produce a valid
set of IPI4, send it to the IMD to make it assume it is in
a critical situation and authorize access. Similar results were
validated using a smart phone camera in [86]. Accordingly,
a remote adversary can convince the IMD that it is its
Guardian and successfully establish a secure channel with
it. Additionally, a man-in-the-middle attack on the method
by which the IMD and the Guardian confirm the key bits
extracted from the IPI block was presented in [87]. In
this attack, at the end of round one of the parity check, the
adversary interrupts the response of the IMD and sends the
Guardian a random hash value, thus prompting the Guardian
to send a reject message and enter round two. Moreover, the
adversary can change the reject to accept and consequently,
the IMD terminates the protocol and keeps three bits from
each IPI block as secret key material. On the other side, The
adversary keeps communicating with the Guardian through
round two where she knows one bit of information from each
consecutive 3 bits of the key used by the IMD from the leaked
parity bit. It should be noted that IMD Guard use the hash
function in the emergency mode protocol in an unjustified
manner. More precisely, when the programmer receives the
two challenges from the IMD, it replies with a message
containing the hash of their xor which we find no reason
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for using this unkeyed hash function as anyone can evaluate it.
IMD Shield: This solution offers a non cryptographic
communication between the IMD and the external device
which is called the shield [69]. The shield is an externally
worn device responsible for authenticating and authorizing
programmers which can establish a cryptographically secure
channel with it. It is also responsible for relaying the responses
of the IMD to commands issued by authorized programmers.
The shield accomplishes its task by adopting a full duplex
radio device which acts as a jammer and receiver. In other
words, it employs a jamming antenna and a receive antenna
where the jamming antenna transmits a random signal to
scramble the IMDs transmissions. The receive antenna is
simultaneously connected to both a transmit and a receive
chain where the transmit chain sends an antidote signal that
cancels the jamming signal at the receive antenna, enabling it
to receive the IMDs scrambled signal and decode it. Because,
only the shield can generate the antidote signal, it is the only
party that can decode the IMD’s jammed signal. The shield
also jams any communication from unauthorized programmers
so that their transmissions cannot be decoded by the IMD and
hence it will not respond to them. If the shield is absent, the
IMD replies to all commands because all its transmissions are
sent unscrambled. Another scheme called BodyDouble [70]
adopts a similar approach but employs a spoofing mechanism
by which the external device pretends to be the IMD and
communicates with adversaries. Such technique thwarts the
vulnerability of the IMD to battery draining attacks.
Strengths: The most important feature of the Shield
which distinguishes it from other protocols is its support
to the already implanted device. Particularly, with millions
of patients who already have wireless IMDs, the shield can
be used to provide security to such devices as it requires
no additional modification. It is also very considerate to the
battery life of the implant as it requires no special effort in
terms of communication or computation from the IMD’s side.
Unlike other wearable devices where the IMD has to detect
their presence in case of emergencies and sometimes has to
wait and/or issue additional messages to them, the response
time of the IMD to all commands is the same whether the
Shield is present or not. Also, because jamming consumes
power and the Shield should jam the IMD’s transmission
effectively, it can detect the timing when the IMD is expected
to respond and then start jamming. More precisely, according
to the MICS band regulations for IMD communication, IMDs
transmit only in a response to commands from programmers
without sensing the medium so the shield listens for program-
mers transmissions and can predict when the IMD may start
transmitting and bound the duration of its responses.
Weaknesses: Jamming is the adopted approach by this
proposal to thwart both passive and active adversarial attacks.
However, operating jamming devices has legal consequences
because it can interfere with other RF devices and potentially
lead to legal complications. Also, commercial devices that
operate in the MICS band have to adhere to the FCC power
limitations. However, an adversary that transmits at high
power can not be jammed by the Shield and the IMD will
respond to such communications. Such transmissions can
be detected by the Shield which raises an alarm to inform
the patient and also jams the IMD responses, but still, such
adversary can easily launch a battery draining attack because
the IMD always responds to its commands. The effect of
friendly jamming where a jamming device is used to protect
the confidentiality of communications was undermined in
[57]. More precisely, it has been demonstrated in [57] that
an attacker with multiple receiving antennas can recover
information from the protected jammed signals.
3) Biometric-based Protocols: Biometric techniques
employ information extracted from the physical or
physiological features of the patient [18], [88]. Adopting
such information to form access credentials avoids the key
distribution problem between the IMD and programmers.
Accordingly, it is considered more feasible than that solutions
based on shared keys. Also, because they require being
physically in contact with the patient which implies her
consent to the requested access to the IMD. In case of
critical situations where the patient is unconscious, medical
personnels can acquire such features and use them to access
the IMD.
Biometric-based Two-level Secure Access Control (BBS-
AC): In [71], Hei and Du propose a solution that enforces
access control procedure using two levels of authentication.
More precisely, BBS-AC requires programmers to provide
biometric features from the patient in two consecutive levels.
At the first level of authentication, the scheme requires basic
biometric information, such as fingerprints pattern, height, and
eye color. If a programmer is authenticated through the first
level, the second level of authentication takes place where the
patient’s iris snap shot is required to determine whether the
programmer is authorized to access the IMD or not.
Strengths: The adopted two levels method takes the
limited battery life in consideration. More precisely, the first
level of authentication is light weight as it involves comparing
numeric values which represent fingerprints pattern, height,
and eye color to the ones stored on the IMD. The second level
calls for a more computationally exhaustive procedure required
for iris recognition. Thus, in the case of an adversary, who has
no knowledge of the required biometric values, tries to connect
to the IMD, only the first lightweight level of authentication
is executed and the request is rejected, which saves the power
required for the iris recognition and hence the power of the
IMD. It is also expected that the features required in the first
level can be acquired if someone is at close proximity of the
patient but obtaining a high quality snapshot of the iris requires
an infrared camera [71] at a distance of between fifty and
seventy centimeters. Such snapshot can only be taken of the
iris of either a consenting patient or an unconscious one. The
proposal also proposes a method to perform the iris verification
step by matching partial iris data rather than the entire iris data
which significantly reduces the computation overhead of this
step, thus saving the limited power of IMDs.
Weaknesses: BBS-AC requires data related to the
biometric features of the patient to be pre-stored in the
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IMD prior to implantation which is equivalent to setting a
predeployed master key. Accordingly, because this data is
not supposed to change with time, all the medical personnels
who use it can know the secret as well. In other words, the
secret after multiple uses will not be a secret anymore and
it cannot be changed either. Biometrics in general including
dynamic ECG signals bind access to IMDs to the physical
presence of the patient which may not be convenient for
the case where IMD remote monitoring is required. Also,
biometric measurements are rarely perfect, especially in
case of an incapacitated or seizuring patient, taking her
iris snapshot may be impossible as iris cannot be fully
visible. Additionally, measurements taken using two different
reading devices, could generate different results. Accordingly,
these scenarios result in credentials that prevents the desired
critical access to the IMD even if the programmer is legitimate.
Heart-to-Heart (H2H): Proposed by Rostami et al. [72],
this scheme is a cryptographic authentication protocol that uses
ECG signals to ensure proximity. This protocol proposes that
both the IMD and the programmer which is requesting access
to measure the heart activities by recording the ECG signal at
the same time. Afterwards, both the IMD and the programmer
extract the least significant four bits from a consecutive set
of intra pulse timing intervals (IPI4). In the sequel, the
programmer sends its recorded set of IPI4 to the IMD. This
reading can be different than what is read by the IMD due
to recording errors. To decide whether to accept the reading
as genuine or reject the session, the IMD first evaluates the
error by comparing the received reading to the one it recorded.
Then, using Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing [72] where
the hypothesis is that the calculated error is drawn from the
error probability distribution of an honest programmer, access
decision is established. The cryptographic protocol starts by
first setting up a secure channel using TLS [89] where the
programmer sends its certificate to the IMD which acts as
the client. The output of this stage is a shared master key
and a random value. Next the authentication stage takes place
where each party commits to its set of IPI4 after binding it
to the shared random number generated from the TLS session.
Then commitments are exchanged and based on the output of
the Neyman-Pearson test on the difference between the two
readings, the IMD accepts or rejects the programmer’s access
request.
Strengths: In the secure channel setup, TLS is employed
where the programmer send it certificate to the IMD. However,
the certificate is used by the IMD to extract the public
key of the programmer only, thus the procedure involves
no verification via Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which
saves the battery power. Another advantage is that during the
authentication stage and after exchanging the commitment, the
programmer reveals its reading to the IMD only after accepting
the received reading from the IMD. The order of revealing
the commitments prevents the reuse of the programmer’s
reading by an adversary in a man-in-the-middle attack. Also
the authors propose that in the case of heart failure or other
life threatening conditions where the ECG signal of the IMD
has no pulse, all access control procedures are dropped.
Weaknesses: The protocol assumes that ECG readings
and thus the sequence of IPI4 can only be evaluated
by a device touching the body of the patient. However, the
protocols suffers from the limitation of ECG signals discussed
in the IMD Guard protocol. Another weakness of this protocol
is that the TLS session takes place where the IMD performs
a modular exponentiation operation (RSA encryption)
before checking if the programmer is legitimate or not.
Although in the event of the IMD rejecting an authentication
attempt it waits one reading cycle before accepting any
requests, the system is vulnerable to battery draining attacks
given the modular exponentiation computational requirements.
ECG-based Secret Data Sharing (ESDS): Zheng et al.
[73] proposed this technique by which a programmer can
establish a secure channel and authenticate itself to the IMD
using ECG signals. First, the IMD and the programmer mea-
sure ECG signals synchronously. Then, both parties generate a
secret key bit string by concatenating the five least significant
bits from consecutive sets of IPIs. Next, all the data that
needs to be shared privately is first encoded using an Error
Correcting Code (ECC) technique. ECC adds redundant check
bits to the transfered data which can be used by the receiver
to correct bit errors via a decoding procedure. In the sequel,
the coded data is then xored by the ECG IPI bit string to
encrypt it. Typically, ECC schemes are used to correct system
noise but because ECG data is xored to the coded data, it can
be used to correct difference between the ECG readings by
both the IMD and programmer.
Strengths: The algorithm is straightforward and simple.
Encryption and authentication involve no public key primi-
tives. Moreover, encryption is performed via xor which makes
the algorithm very light in terms of power consumption.
Weaknesses: This proposal suffers from the challenges
of ECG-based schemes. Particularly, if an adversary is able to
remotely measure ECG signals by observing changes in skin
color or movements induced by heart pulses, then she would
be able to remotely authenticate herself and gain access
to the IMD. Moreover, since ECG signal is used to derive
the encryption key, an eavesdropper observing the pairing
process between a legitimate programmer and the IMD may
be able reproduce the shared key and decrypt the exchanged
information.
4) Hybrid approaches: Techniques in this category [75],
[76] utilize one of the previously discussed categories to
provide access to IMDs in the case of emergency.
Emergency Aware Access Control (EA-AC): This proto-
col [76] assumes that a proxy device is worn by the patient and
that it shares a long term key with the IMD. It also proposes
that the state of emergency (e.g., heart failure, hypoglycemic
attacks, or high blood pressure) is solely determined by the
IMD , in which case the protocol does not provide fail
open access but alerts the proxy device. Upon receiving an
emergency signal, the proxy device accesses a virtual space
using a web service, specifies the required medical service and
the location of the IMD. In response to the proxy’s request,
the web service provides a list of doctors who are available
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in close proximity of the patient and with a doctor’s consent,
the proxy allows access to the IMD for a limited period only
to this doctor. More precisely, the device provides the chosen
doctor with temporary constrained access credentials for the
IMD.
Strengths: The algorithm pays a great attention to access
control in case of emergency. While one may argue that fail
open access is the preferred method to deal with emergency
situations, EAAC emphasizes on the fact that attacks can take
place even in such scenario and that role-based access [90],
[91] to a given physician must be decided by the criticality of
the medical condition which is determined by the IMD. Also,
all the security procedure is carried out by the proxy device
which saves the battery of the IMD.
Weaknesses: In addition to having a predeployed key
shared between the IMD and the proxy, EAAC adds to the
weaknesses of proxy devices protocols. Particularly, if the
proxy is lost or stolen, the IMD is inaccessible in the event
of an emergency. Also the protocol relies heavily on the fact
that physicians must regularly sign in to the virtual space and
provide their availability and location which may not be easily
accepted by all medical staff. The protocol also runs a lot
of procedures to provide emergency response to the patient’s
condition requiring network access, waiting times, and most
shockingly the availability of a consenting physician in the
vicinity of the patient. Alternatively, it is more reasonable to
alert emergency responders and provide fail open access.
Hospital Authentication Server Access Control (HAS-
AC): This authentication mechanism [75] proposes the use
of a three tier architecture for access control. It assumes that
patients with IMDs that are treated within a given hospital
share a long term key with a hospital server. Also, physicians
in the hospital share a long term key with the authentication
server. When an incapacitated patient is present at the hospital,
a general purpose programmer can be customized using the
physician and the IMD keys which they share with the hospital
sever to access the IMD. More precisely, the physician inserts a
smart card containing her long term key and signing key. In the
sequel, the programmer verifies the identity of the physician
from the hospital server and requests the ID of the patient’s
IMD. Afterwards, the programmer sends an authorization
request to the server which subsequently provides both the
IMD and the programmer with a session key to continue their
communication. In the event that the patient is admitted to
a hospital different than hers, the protocol assumes that the
patient wears a medical bracelet with an access key to disable
the IMD.
Strengths: The protocol addresses the problem of having
a specific programmer for each IMD that can be operated by
any individual in the case of a non consenting patient. In other
words, it provides a means for general purpose programmers
to be personalized according to an authenticated physician
and IMD. Accordingly, only authorized physicians can operate
programmers and any programmer can be used with any IMD.
Weaknesses: This proposal does not provide a solution
for the problem of emergency authentication when the patient
is outside her usual treatment facility. In fact, the protocol
proposes that the patient wears a medical bracelet with
an access key for that purpose. Accordingly, the IMD can
become inaccessible in the event of an emergency if the
bracelet is forgotten or lost.
Trade-offs between the applicability of the provided security
features and the safety of the patient are very evident in
the previously surveyed proposals. In fact, each one of these
access control proposals offer a specific balance between
security and safety. Some are completely leaned towards
the safety of the patient especially in emergency situations,
which consequently comes on the expense of the other factor.
Examples of such schemes include the Cloaker where once
the wearable device is taken off, no additional communication
from the IMD is required to allow open access. On the other
hand, it requires the IMD to either continuously update the
state of the Cloaker or to check it upon receiving access
request. The first case affects the battery life and the second
case makes the IMD vulnerable to denial of service attacks.
On the other hand, protocols such as Heart-to-Heart enforce
active security measures at the time of emergency. In fact,
this protocol first establishes a TLS secure channel and uses
an ECG fresh reading to prove the proximity of the emergency
personnel. However, the TLS step involves modular addition
and it is carried out before authenticating the requesting
programmer which makes the IMD vulnerable to a battery
draining attack. All the above protocols do not solve the
problem of backward compatibility, except the Shield which
does not require any alteration of the firmware of the IMD and
it does not enforces any cryptographic solution that burdens
the battery of the IMD. However, its use on a wide scale is
questionable, mainly because it is a jamming device and its
operation may affect other communication leading to further
legal restrictions.
Table I provides a comparison of the surveyed authentica-
tion proposals in terms of keys used by the IMD communi-
cations where predeployed key refers to a key that is used
throughout the lifetime of the IMD and dynamic key refers to
a key that is newly generated for each session. In the case of
proxy based and three tier approaches, the intended key refer
to the key shared between the IMD and the external device
or the third party. Also, we contrast the surveyed protocols
with respect to the cryptographic methods implemented in the
IMD. Moreover, we indicate how fast the IMD responds to
the programmer request in the case of emergency. Also, merits
including their vulnerability to battery draining attacks (BDA),
whether the established key can be acquired by an adversary,
if access is always guaranteed, the need for additional devices
other than the IMD, and the probability of detecting an
emergency when there is none (false alarm) are addressed.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Unlike information security of computer systems, cyber
security of IMDs is a relatively new area. Particularly because
people only started realizing the urgent need for protecting
these critical systems when the actual attacks on IMDs which
directly affect the patient’s wellbeing were realized in-vitro
[15], [36], [43]. Most of the efforts from the security com-
munity are focused on the design and analysis of access
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF IMD AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS. BDAS: BATTERY DRAINING ATTACKS, N/A MEANS THAT THE INFORMATION WAS NOT






























ZP Sec [15] X X fast low X X X X
US-DB [65] X X X moderate moderate X X
in-vivo NFC [66] X N/A N/A moderate low N/A X
The Cloaker [67] X X fast low X X
IMD Guard [68] X X slow moderate X X X
The shield [69] fast high X X X X
BBS-AC [71] X X moderate low X
H2H [72] X X X slow high X X X
ESDS [73] X X moderate moderate X X
EA-AC [76] X X slow moderate X X
HAS-AC [75] X X slow low X
protocols for IMDs. Indeed, the required dynamic nature of
such procedures which distinguishes them from the standard
methods used in computer systems makes realizing both
security and safety a challenging task. In fact, among all
the dozen surveyed emergency authentication solutions, none
achieves the required levels of security and safety which makes
this direction remain as an open problem. Most of the surveyed
authentication proposals provide informal proofs to justify how
the cryptographic protocol achieves both security and safety
requirements. However, using only this approach makes it
easy to overlook an essential assumption which can lead to
contradictory situation between security and safety. Verifying
that both the security and safety requirements are satisfied
simultaneously can be achieved by formal methods [92]–[94].
Accordingly, an interesting research direction is to attempt to
apply formal verification techniques on the IMD authentication
protocols in order to validate the claims of their designers and
accordingly, gain the confidence of the security community.
Despite the criticality of managing authorized access of IMDs,
some areas such as secure control [95], [96] of IMDs are
essentially as important and the existing work addressing them
is very limited. In what follows, we highlight some challenging
areas in the hope of having our discussion serve as first steps
for future research directions:
 IMD forensic investigation: Auditing is usually a stan-
dard tool for forensic investigation in computer systems.
Particularly, accountability of actions can be determined
if an audit log is utilized. Such log records system activi-
ties in a chronological order and subsequently enables the
reconstruction of the sequence of events and changes in
the state of the system. Accordingly, in the case of a secu-
rity breach, audit logs are essential components required
for forensic investigation. For IMDs, security incidents
can lead to the patient’s death as has been demonstrated
in-vitro in [15], [36], [37], [43] which makes auditing
essential in IMDs. Unfortunately, audit logs require mem-
ory which is a scarce resource in IMDs. For example,
the average memory of a modern cardiac defibrillator
is around 1 MB and nearly 75% of it is consumed
by its basic functions which leaves very small memory
for logging purposes [11]. Accordingly, with such small
memory, audit logs can be easily overflown and thus
bypassed. Even though there has been no reported cases
on death resulting from a security attacks on IMDs, there
is no definitive way to differentiation between whether
death is caused by an intentional tampering of the implant
or from natural causes. The little work in this area
is mainly attributed to the diversification of required
expertise. For instance, when a deceased patient with an
IMD arrives at the morgue, without the knowledge of
biomedical engineering, the corner cannot determine if
the cause of death is a result of natural circumstances, a
malfunction of the IMD, or an intentional sabotage of the
working of the IMD . On the other side, in order to be
able to design auditing methods for forensic investigation
in IMDs, biomedical engineers need to understand how
medical investigators work. A recent effort in this area
is presented by Ellouze et al. [97] where they developed
an inference system that uses evidence from technical
investigators and medical deductions from pathologists
to determine the probability of a given attack scenario
being the source of the patient’s death. With millions of
IMDs implanted in the U.S. and given the fact that some
of them can be high value targets [33], killing without
leaving a trace must not be that easy. It is crucially urgent
for researchers from all the concerned disciplines to work
together and find systematic ways to distinguish crime
from fate.
 Intrusion detection (ID) in IMDs: A computer system
uses an ID system to try to identify if the system activity
is a result of genuine or malicious communication. It
usually monitors the network traffic and performs some
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analysis using either anomaly or signature identification.
Anomaly-based ID systems monitors incoming traffic and
compares it to an established pattern for the normal
behavior of the system. Such pattern is usually identified
by the ID system during a training stage where various
parameters of normal communication are observed by
the system for an extended period of time. On the other
hand, signature based ID systems compare the monitored
communication with a preset repository of attributes
from previously known threats. Both systems are usu-
ally employed together to perform intrusion detection
in computer systems because each of them has its own
limitations that the other can solve. Particularly, anomaly-
based ID systems suffer from the high false positive
detections and signature-based ID systems cannot spot
new threats.
There are only few works covering the area of intrusion
detection in IMDs. Existing proposals [45], [98], [99]
adopt an anomaly-based approach to try detecting battery
depletion resulting from malicious communication. Train-
ing parameters include physiological changes that ac-
company therapy administration following genuine IMD
operations [98], information related to the commands
which are usually issued by a legitimate programmer [45],
and certain characteristics of the radio signals generated
in authorized communication [99]. Most of the available
proposals suggest the use of an external device to carryout
the work of the ID system [45], [99] to protect the battery
of the IMD from over consumption. No proposals have
considered signature-based ID and with the limitations of
anomaly detection techniques, there is a need for further
investigation in the area of intrusion detection.
 Software and hardware vulnerabilities in IMDs: Soft-
ware plays a fundamental role in the safe operation of
IMDs. In 2010, the FDA recalled 23 defective cardiac
pacemakers [100]. At least six of the defective pacemak-
ers were recalled due to software defects. Following the
trend of security by obscurity [5], manufactures of IMDs
employ proprietary software which might be more bene-
ficial from financial perspective. However, from security
perspective open source software is arguably more secure
as it becomes subjected to continuous international au-
diting which improves its reliability and security through
the identification and patching of the discovered vulner-
abilities. Accordingly, the challenge for future research
is how to balance both the financial interests of IMD
manufacturers and the desirable security benefits that
come with the open software especially that such benefits
directly affect the safety of patients with IMDs. Also,
hardware Trojans [101], [102]that may be intentionally
designed in IMDs to disable security mechanisms when
triggered can have catastrophic consequences. Testing
IMDs for hardware Trojans is a very challenging task and
requires further attention from the security community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have briefly visited security trade-offs in
cyber physical systems. We have identified the threats, and
challenges facing the adoption of a given risk mitigation mech-
anism. Also, we have discussed the effects of cyber security
and how it has an effect on the safety of the surrounding
environment of the system. As a case study, we have surveyed
the case of IMDs. Particularly, we categorized and contrasted
different proposals targeting the concept of emergency authen-
tication. Such proposals try to balance the trade off between
providing security measures for the IMD and the safety of the
patient at the time of emergency. Moreover, we have identified
a number of security advantages and vulnerabilities in our
analysis for each protocol. Given the tension between how
each protocol handles both security and safety requirements in
a power constrained environment, we conclude that the topic
of emergency authentication is still an open area for further
research. Moreover, we have cited a number of challenges
that face IMD security mechanisms along with some possible
research directions
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